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A Dilemma in Springfield: The Scope and
Limitations of the Governor's Amendatory
Veto Power in Illinois
Delegates to the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention arrived in
Springfield without any intention of transforming their state government
into a dictatorship. Yet, with the enactment of article IV, section
9(e),' of the new constitution (hereinafter referred to as the amendatory veto), many legislators have expressed fears that the downfall of
the democracy in Illinois is imminent. Senator Hudson R. Sours predicted that the power of the Governor would rise to a height comparRepresentative
able to Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini or Julius Caesar.'
John S. Matijevich concurred in this prophecy of catastrophic consequences:
This provision places dictatorial powers in the hands of the governor. . . . It's very dangerous. A ruthless governor could use
it and wield it to the detriment of everybody. 3
As yet, Sours' and Matijevich's forecasts of doom have not materialized. However, the scope and limitations of the amendatory veto
power of the Governor of Illinois have remained the subject of considerable debate among the three branches of government since the constitution's passage in 1970.
The amendatory veto concept has been praised by some constitutional scholars as a pragmatic gubernatorial device which maximizes
efficiency and excellence in the legislative process.4 The progressive
intent behind the clause is to "provide an avenue for the governor to
suggest a change instead of vetoing outright bills presented to him."'
1.

ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9(e).

Transcript of the Senate Session, May 1, 1973, at 47.
Wheeler, Legislators Tell Dangers of Amending Veto Power, Chicago SunNov. 22, 1971, at 6, 18, col. 1.
Netsch, The Executive, CoN-CON-ISSUES FOR THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 180 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Netsch].
5. 6TH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT, vol. 3, at
1338.

2.
3.
Times,
4.
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In the past, important legislation met an unfortunate death on the Governor's desk whenever he failed to agree with one minor portion of
a bill passed by the General Assembly. Proponents of the amendatory
veto have heralded the provision as a money-and-time-saver since it
provides an opportunity to expeditiously enact an altered bill into law.
There is no longer need for the bill's sponsor to regroup his forces,
hoping his piece of legislation will fare better during the next General
Assembly session.
These conflicting views regarding the scope of the amendatory veto
provision result from a failure of the Convention delegates to resolve
the ambiguities of the veto clause. Unstated in either the transcripts
of the Constitutional Convention or in the final language of article IV,
section 9(e), is an explicit declaration of the scope of the veto power.
As a result of this lack of constitutional guidance, the delegates in
Springfield created more than just a constitution in 1970; they created
an interpretive battleground.
THE BIRTH OF A CONFRONTATION

In an attempt to offer the Governor an alternative to an outright
veto of a bill, the delegates on the Executive Committee, the Legislative
Committee, and the Committee on Styling, Drafting and Submission
formulated the amendatory veto clause.' Taking note of the relative
success of the amendatory veto provision in four other states' constitutions,7 the delegates from these committees attempted to present to the
Convention a provision that would allow the lawmaking wheels of government to turn more effectively than they had operated under the three
previous Illinois constitutions.8 The amendatory veto clause as finally
adopted by the Constitutional Convention states:
The Governor may return a bill together with specific recommendations for change to the house in which it originated. The bill shall
be considered in the same manner as a vetoed bill but the specific
recommendations may be accepted by a record vote of a majority
of the members elected to each house. Such bills shall be presented -again to the Governor and if he certifies that such acceptance conforms to his specific recommendations, the bill shall become law. If he does not so certify, he shall return it as a vetoed
bill to the house in which it originated.9
6.

6TH ILLINOIS CONsTrrTunoNAL CONVENTION, CoMMrTTEE PROPOSALS, Vol. 6, at

403.
7. ALA. CONST. art. V, § 125; MASS. CONST. art. I, § 186; N.J. CONST. art. V,
§ 1 (14a); VA. CONST. art. V, § 6(3).

8.

The three previous Illinois constitutions were adopted in 1818, 1848 and 1870.

9.

ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9(e).
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Analogous to an abbreviated ping-pong game, with legislation
bouncing back and forth between the General Assembly and the Governor,' ° the amendatory veto is the newest alternative open to a Governor who disagrees with a bill." As indicated, when the Governor
receives a bill from the Legislature, he may return it to the house of
its origination along with "specific recommendations" for change. The
initial legislative body then has fifteen days to accept or reject the recommendations and to send the bill to the other house which follows
the same procedure. If the General Assembly accepts the alterations
by a majority vote of each house, it returns the bill to the Governor
for certification. Once again the Governor has the option to sign the
bill or return it as a vetoed bill to the original house. On the other
hand, if the Legislature chooses to reject the Governor's specific recommendations, it can enact the original bill into law only by overriding
his veto with a record vote of three-fifths of each legislative body.
This procedure places the state's chief executive directly in the middle
of the legislative process. As a result, state senators and representatives
have vociferously objected that the amendatory veto does great violence
to the democratic principle embodied in the state's past constitu10.
1357.

11.

6TH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION,

VERBATIM

TRANSCRIPT,

vol. 3, at

The relevant veto provisions state:
If the Governor does not approve the bill, he shall veto it by returning
it with his objections to the house in which it originated. Any bill not
so returned by the Governor within 60 calendar days after it is presented to him shall become law. If recess or adjournment of the General Assembly prevents the return of a bill, the bill and the Governor's
objections shall be filed with the Secretary of State within such 60 calendar days. The Secretary of State shall return the bill and objections
to the originating house promptly upon the next meeting of the same
General Assembly at which the bill can be considered.
(c) The house to which a bill is returned shall immediately enter the Governor's objections upon its journal. If within fifteen calendar days after
such entry that house by a record vote of three-fifths of the members
selected passes the bill, it shall become law.
(d) The Governor may reduce or veto any item of appropriations in a bill
presented to him. Portions of a bill not reduced or vetoed shall become
law. An item vetoed shall be returned to the house in which it originated and may be restored to its original amount in the same manner
as a vetoed bill except that the required vote shall be a majority of the
members elected to each house. If a reduced item is not so restored,
it shall become law in the reduced amount.
(e) The Governor may return a bill together with specific recommendations
for change to the house in which it originated. The bill shall be considered in the same manner as a vetoed bill but the specific recommendations may be accepted by a record vote of a majority of the members
elected to each house. Such bills shall be presented again to the Governor and if he certifies that such acceptance conforms to his specific recommendations, the bill shall become law. If he does not so certify, he
shall return it as a vetoed bill to the house in which it originated.
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9(b) (c) (d) (e).
(b)
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tions. 12 Another criticism of the amendatory veto provision is that3
it upsets the framework of separation of powers in state government.'
Undoubtedly, the Governor takes a more active role in the passage of
legislation under the new constitution. However, proponents of the
veto clause are neither convinced that such an active part in the legislative process is undesirable nor that it is new to Illinois politics. Senator
Dawn Clark Netsch, the original sponsor of the amendatory veto in
the Constitutional Convention, noted that the committees designed the
veto provision with two thoughts in mind: first, the delegates realized
that the Governor already took an active part in proposing and opposing legislation;' 4 secondly, it was the Convention's opinion that the
people needed a more resourceful governor to deal expeditiously with
current conflicts in the state of Illinois.' 5 In advocating the strengthening of the Governor's position, Senator Netsch observed:
The overwhelming weight of scholarly opinion supports the thesis
that effective American state government requires a single, strong,
popularly elected executive with adequate powers to serve as the
principal spokesman for and leader of the broadest possible public
interest. 16
Another proponent of the amendatory veto has noted that, in essence, the provision does not alter the separation of powers formula.
The Legislature still has the prerogative to reject the Governor's
amendments if the lawmakers feel the chief executive has stepped
outside his scope of authority. The Governor still cannot effectively
direct policy without securing the support of at least a majority of the
Legislature.' 7 This protection lends weight to the observation of Senator Netsch that strengthening of one branch of the government does
not necessarily weaken another branch.'
At least partially due to an interpretive dilemma over the scope of
the amendatory powers of the Governor, the advantages of the provision have been lost amid a power struggle in Springfield. By contrast,
studies by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention showed that
legislators in the four pioneering states overcame the petty bickering
and embraced the amendatory veto as a useful means of accommodation between the governor and legislature.' 9 In Alabama, for exam12.

Transcript of the Senate Session, May 1, 1973, at 30.

13.

Id. at 41.

14.

15.
16.

17.
(1956).

18.

19.
1338.

Netsch, supra note 4, at 176.

Transcript of the Senate Session, May 1, 1973, at 45.
Netsch, supra note 4, at 148.
C. RANSONE, JR., THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR IN THE UNITED STATES
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Transcript of the Senate Session, May 1, 1973, at 45.
6TH

ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
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pie, all but seven of two hundred and thirty-five such vetoed bills
were enacted according to the Governor's suggestions in the fifty years
following the passage of the veto provision.2 0 In addition to receiving
approval from the legislatures, state courts have also embraced the
amendatory veto concept. In the Application of McGlynn2 1 New
Jersey's highest court analyzed its state's constitutional provision, part
of which is similar to the amendatory veto clause in the Illinois constitution. Although the court noted that the framers of the New Jersey
constitution failed to explicate the extent of the Governor's veto power,
it held that the veto clause
was clearly intended to take care of a situation where the Governor does not wholly agree with the bill, but approves
of it in prin22
ciple or is willing to accept only portions thereof.
Such a pragmatic application of the veto provision has resulted in praise
by executives, legislators, judges, and scholars who view the new veto
system as one of the most promising legislative developments in
years." Unquestionably, non-substantive technical changes made by the
Governor in Illinois would receive the same staunch support in the
Land of Lincoln as substantive changes have in New Jersey. A gubernatorial correction of a minor error in a bill would hardly bring on
prophecies of a dictatorship. However, major substantive revisions of
legislation by the two Illinois Governors who have utilized the power
have raised these outcries from the General Assembly.
The broad use of amendatory veto power by Governors Ogilvie and
Walker has highlighted the Convention's failure to delineate the extent
of the Governor's authority to fundamentally alter bills. Can the Governor make major substantive changes in the bills and still act within
the framework of the amendatory veto? May the legislators make additions to or deletions from some of the Governor's suggestions when
the chief executive returns an unsigned bill? These questions must
promptly be resolved to avoid a destructive power struggle between the
legislative and executive branches of government in Illinois.
AN ATTEMPT To SOLVE THE DILEMMATHE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S APPROACH

In October of 1971, Senator W. Russell Arrington wrote a letter to
20.

C. RANSONE,

JR., THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR IN THE UNITED STATES

(1956).
21.
22.

23.
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58 N.J. Super. 1, 155 A.2d 289 (1959).
Id. at 15, 155 A.2d at 296.
J. KALLENBACH, THE AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE 366 (1966).
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William J. Scott, Illinois Attorney General, requesting an interpretation
of the scope of the amendatory veto in reference to the Legislature's
right to further revise bills vetoed by the Governor under article IV,
section 9(e).14 Scott suggested that the proper analytical approach
to determining the extent of the veto power would be to review previous
methods utilized by the Illinois Supreme Court to interpret past constitutions. Scott concluded that the supreme court has formulated the
following standards:
(a) that the Illinois Constitution is to be liberally construed;
(b) that the meaning of constitutional language is best ascertained
by considering the purposes of the disputed provision; (c) that
such a provision should be construed to give effect to the spirit
in which, it was adopted; (d) that narrow, technical reasoning
should not be applied; and (e) that which is within the intention is
within the provision even if not within the letter. 25
This analysis began with an examination of a case which involved a
debate over whether the original Constitutional Convention intended
to grant the Legislature the power to charter the Bank of Illinois.2 6 The
court held that the sensible intent of the framers should govern
its decision. In other words, when the construction of a constitutional
provision results in an unreasonable interpretation of a bill, the court
has advocated that such a reading should be avoided, provided the
clause is susceptible to another interpretation.
Scott drew upon three other cases to support his standards of constitutional analysis. In People of Illinois v. Vickroy2 7 the Illinois
Supreme Court stated its approval of a reasonable and practical interpretation of constitutional provisions. The Vickroy court reached this
conclusion while holding invalid the Legislature's attempt to give township authorities the power to regulate the salaries of town officers in
accordance with the size of their counties. In another case the Illinois
Supreme Court concluded that interpreters of constitutional provisions
28
should adopt broad but reasonable constructions whenever possible.
Thus, the court allowed the General Assembly to alter the provisions
of a special charter to the city of Jacksonville, Illinois, and commented:
In construing constitutions, as with statutes, the chief purpose is
to give effect to the intent of the makers. In seeking such inten24. 1971 Op. ILL. ATT'Y GEN. 110. Presumably, Scott would apply many of the
same standards to an examination of the limits on the Governor's amendatory veto
authority.
25. Id. at 112.
26. People ex rel. Stickney v. Marshall, 6 Ill. 672 (1844).
384, 107 N.E.638 (1915).
27. 266 Ill.
28. People ex rel. Rogerson v. Crawley, 274 Ill. 139, 113 N.E. 119 (1916).
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the legislature, the
tion we are to consider the language used by 29
evil to be remedied and the object to be attained.
Scott concluded his support for his interpretive standards by citing
Wolfson v. Avery.30 The Wolfson court examined the transcripts of the
Fifth Constitutional Convention as a guide to determining the validity of
a legislative attempt to classify directors of corporations in a unique manner. As the Illinois Supreme Court observed:
[T]he practice of consulting the debates of the members of
the convention which framed the constitution, as aiding to a correct determination of the intent of the framers of the instrument,
has long been indulged in by courts as aiding to a true understanding of the meaning of provisions that are thought to be doubtful. 31
Following the advice of this opinion, an analysis of the transcripts
of the Sixth Constitutional Convention is necessary to gain insight into
the intent of the framers. According to Attorney General Scott, the
courts will interpret the delegates' comments as liberally as possible in
an attempt to avoid narrow technical objections to the amendatory veto
provision. 2 However, before the constitutional scholar embarks upon
an examination of the Convention's records, Governor Ogilvie has suggested an intermediate step in the analysis. According to the Ogilvie
plan, the key word in the amendatory veto interpretation is "germane.""
THE GERMANE TEST AND THE SCOPE OF AN AMENDMENT

From Governor Ogilvie's point of view, the amendatory veto is merely
one cog in the legislative machinery. The Governor strongly urged
that the applications of the veto be examined under the same standards which the courts have applied to other amendments to bills. In
support of his position, Governor Ogilvie observed:
I believe the proper limits on the amendatory veto power are those
which apply to the General Assembly itself when one house amends
a bill passed by another. The constitution requires that "bills...
shall be confined to one subject." Amendments must be germane
or closely akin to the purpose of changing the subject matter of
a bill under the original number. Similarly, the governor's amendatory recommendations must be germane to the subject matter of
the legislation. Beyond this, it is hard to see how the Court can
and should draw a line between a governor's recommendations
29. Id. at 143, 113 N.E. at 120-21.
2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
30. 6 Ill.
31. Id. at 88, 126 N.E.2d at 707.
32. 1971 OP.ILL. ATT'Y GEN. 112.
33. Hanley, The 1970 Illinois Constitution and the Executive Veto, V PUBLIC
AFFAIRS BULLETIN 15 (January-February and March-April, 1972) [hereinafter cited as
Hanley].
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which are permissible and those which are not. If a governor
proposes a change in a bill and both houses of the general assembly agree with him by majority
vote, why should the judicial
34
branch of government intervene?
The leading case which served as the basis of the Ogilvie analysis
is Giebelhausen v. Daley."
The issue in Giebelhausen was not
gubernatorial revision powers, but rather to what extent the Legislature
was permitted to make changes as a bill passed from one house to the
other.
According to the Illinois Supreme Court, an amendment could be
added to a proposed piece of legislation without re-reading the bill three
times (as was constitutionally required for new billsa") if the addition
was germane to the original bill.3 7 The court defined germane by the
words "akin" or "closely allied" or bound by a "common tie." ' A common tie may be found in the "tendency of the provision to promote
the object and purpose of the act to which it belongs." 9 Thus, a legislative amendment has been interpreted to be within a judicially acceptable scope if its substance is germane to the rest of the
bill. It was Ogilvie's contention that this test should be the critical
one for gubernatorial alterations as well.
Although further support for the Ogilvie position can be found in
other cases that have dealt with the proper scope of legislative amendments,40 the Illinois Supreme Court ignored the germane test in its
only encounter with the amendatory veto. 4 1 Despite the fact that the
briefs for both the petitioner and the respondent in People ex rel.
Klinger v. Howlett extensively discussed the germane issue, the court
completely disregarded the concept in expressing its opinion in the
case. 42 Thus, it is apparent that although the germane standard has
been appropriately utilized to determine the acceptable scope of the
Legislature's amendments, in the succession of bills from one house
to the next, the test is inappropriately applied to analyze the limits
of the Governor's amendatory veto power. Therefore, since Ogilvie's
34. Id.; excerpt from the Illinois State Register, Feb. 18, 1972.
35. 407 Ill. 25, 95 N.E.2d 84 (1950).
36. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (1870).
37. Giebelhausen v. Daley, 407 Ill. 25, 46, 95 N.E.2d 84, 93 (1950).
38. Id. at 47, 95 N.E.2d at 94.
39. Id.
40. People ex rel. Brady v. La Salle Street Trust and Savings Bank, 269 111. 518,
110 N.E. 38 (1915); People v. Hightower, 414 Ill. 537, 112 N.E.2d 126 (1953); People ex rel. County Collector v. Jeri Ltd., 40 Ill. 2d 293, 239 N.E.2d 777 (1968).
41. People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 I1. 2d 242, 278 N.E.2d 84 (1972).
42. Brief for Petitioner at 43, Brief for Respondent at 27, People ex rel. Klinger
v. Howlett, 50 Ill. 2d 242, 278 N.E.2d 84 (1972). The Klinger case will be discussed

in greater detail in the next section of this article.
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germane test failed to delineate the scope of the veto provision, it is
advisable to return to the analysis proposed by Attorney General Scott
and take a closer look at the transcripts of the Constitutional Convention in an attempt to solve the interpretive riddle of the amendatory
veto provision.
THE CONVENTION DEBATE

The crucial concern of the delegates who studied the amendatory
veto clause centered on the extent to which the Governor and the Legislature could alter bills before their enactment. In an attempt to eliminate normal delays and expenses incident to legislative failures resulting
from former veto options, the delegates created an alternative procedure. Rather than waiting until the next session of the General Assemly for the bill to reappear on the Governor's desk with the disagreements between the two governmental branches hopefully resolved, the
new veto proposal stressed legislative efficiency.
The Legislature'sAmendatory Veto Powers
As a part of this time-saving procedure, the Executive Committee
sought to avoid the so-called "ping-pong" effect of the Legislature's
sending the Governor's suggestion back with an additional alteration
only to have the Chief Executive make another addition or deletion.
The delegates, therefore, expressed an intent to place certain limitations
on the amendatory veto procedure. Delegate Frank Orlando expressed
the attitude of the committee that formulated the proposal by noting:
The provision covers, as it states there, that if the governor has
an amendment that he feels would cure objections that he would
have or that would leave him no alternative otherwise than to veto
the entire bill-if he has an amendment and sends the bill back
with -the amendment, and the legislature condescends to accept the
change he specifies, then that's it. There is no further action to be
taken by the legislature by
way of changing his amendment or
43
adding something else to it.
Delegate Ronald C. Smith added that if the General Assembly tampered
even slightly with the language of the Governor's amendment, the
houses would have to "start from scratch" on a new bill. 44 Nevertheless, the final draft of the amendatory veto provision ignored the committee's suggestions and instructed the Governor to send "recommen43.
1356.
44.
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dations" rather than "amendments" back to the Legislature. The Convention adopted this wording despite objections that the General
Assembly would interpret this as an open invitation to tamper with the
Governor's language.4 5 Therefore, the Convention adjourned without
clearly indicating the Legislature's options upon receipt of a gubernatorial recommendation. 6
If the spirit of flexibility controlled the interpretation of the amendatory provision, the Legislature apparently could alter the Governor's
revisions with constructive changes. This is the doctrine supported by
Attorney General Scott who feels the flexible reading of the amendatory
veto clause best meets the tests he outlined for analyzing constitutional
provisions:
[T]he General Assembly should not be limited to "acceptance" of a "specific recommendation" as precisely formulated or
restricted but would have some latitude since the Governor might
feel that the acceptance, even though somewhat modified, came
within the spirit if not the letter of his recommendations. He
would then be able to certify that the acceptance "conforms" to his
recommendations, as being similar, in harmony and agreement, or
as resembling or corresponding to them. To hold otherwise would
ignore the use of the special word "conform". The section does
not say the Governor must certify the General Assembly had "accepted", (in the literal word for word sense) his recommendations,
47
but only that the "acceptance conforms" to his recommendations.
Although Scott's textual analysis is persuasive, if the courts interpret
the Constitutional Convention language literally, giving full weight to
the debate on article IV, section 9(e), the General Assembly could
only have unofficial discussions with the Governor, and could not start
45. The initial drafting of the veto provision included the word "suggestions," which
prompted Delegate William H. Sommerschield to state that:
[T]he language does not specify that the revision--or the legislature acceding to the provisions of the governor-has to be exact; and I think this
could be solved by, in line 4 and in line 9, changing the word "suggestions"
to "amendments." Then if they don't agree to the specific amendments, it
is fairly easy to see that they have not agreed to his amendatory veto and
that he cannot certify it.
However, the interpretation of the words "conforming to his suggestion,"
I think, is wide open; and they can conform to the spirit of his suggestions
while not conforming to the specific law-or requirements, as it were-of his
suggestions. I think some consideration should be given to changing the
word "suggestions" to "amendments."
Id. at 1357.
46. Senator Netsch indicated in a personal interview on January 22, 1974, at the
Northwestern University Law School, that the provision's final language was ambiguous, in part due to a failure of many delegates to grasp the entire concept of the
amendatory veto. In addition, those delegates who did understand the operations of the
provision were hesitant to create inflexible procedural regulations that might defeat the
overall intent of this progressive veto.
47. 1971 OP. ILL. Ar'Y GEN. 113.
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to "ping-pong. ' 48 Nevertheless, it appears that since the Convention
opted for the word "recommendation" instead of "amendment" in the
provision, the Legislature should be allowed to make constructive
changes in the Governor's suggestions, despite contrary positions expressed during the debates. After working on a bill on the floors and
in the committees of each house for months, the Legislature deserves
more of a choice 'than an inflexible "pass it" or "override it" decision.4 9
The Scope of the Governor's Power-Substantiveor Technical?
A similar interpretive dilemma exists on the other side of the lawmaking fence. The delegates failed to advise the Governor as to the
extent of his newly discovered power. The only real clues to the limits
of the veto power came from a discussion between the delegates:
MR. R. SMITH: We had testimony to the effect that many of
the bills that are returned are returned for corrections or for simple
deletions-simply to clean up the language. If the legislature can,
instead of sending something back into committee, take care of
that kind of a problem in one day, we felt that that would be
a substantially progressive move.
MRS. NETSCH: Then was it the committee's thought that the
conditional veto would be available only to correct technical errors?
MR. ORLANDO: No, ma'am.50
On the other hand, the explanation and commentary section of the
Legislative Committee on Styling, Drafting and Submission mentions
the amendatory veto with reference only to "technical flaws" in legislative
wording. 1 Thus, the convention once again left the scope of the
provision in a cloudy haze. The clear intent of the delegates was to
maximize the efficiency of the legislative process. The path to effective48. 6TH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT, Vol. 3, at
1355.
49. Transcript of the Senate Session, May 1, 1973, at 40, 41.
This theory, expressed by Senator Howard W. Carroll, is one of the veto's opponents'
most persuasive arguments for altering the present provision. However, the proposed
constitutional amendment would not resolve this ambiguity in the amendatory veto
clause. See note 76 infra.
50. 6TH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT, vol. 3, at
1356.
51. The applicable passage states:
This proposed section, which has no counterpart in the existing Illinois Constitution, offers an alternative to the veto which will be especially helpful
when the Governor finds reason to object to portions of a bill whose general
merit he recognizes. For example, he is now with some degree of regularity
compelled to veto some measures merely because of a technical flaw in their
wording.
6TH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, COMMITTEE PROPOSALS, vol. 6, at 403.
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ness, however, was not specified.5" The implications from the Convention's committee reports reveal that many delegates preferred a
strict, narrow scope of power. 3 On the other hand, Attorney General
Scott has advocated that the more flexible interpretation be upheld. 4
Perhaps an examination of two Governors' experiences with the amendatory veto power can suggest which interpretation is more workable.
THE AMENDATORY VETO IN ACTION

Governor Richard Ogilvie was the first person to wield the amendatory
veto power in Illinois. During the Seventy-Sixth General Assembly
Session, the Governor exercised his amendatory veto on forty-one bills.
Of this group, thirty-one involved changes of substance, and four were
completely rewritten. Twenty-four bills with substantive changes were
approved and certified, but seven others were not accepted by the
Legislature. 5
In the Seventy-Seventh General Assembly, Governor
Ogilvie used the veto power on fifty bills representing 2.5 percent of
the total number of bills passed by the Legislature. 56 This group included thirty-nine amendatory vetoes returned because of substantive
policy disagreements.5 7
A package of three bills dealing with aid to private schools was among
the group that the Governor and the Legislature failed to agree upon
initially. Ogilvie substantially altered the bills, using his amendatory
veto power to insure that the legislation conformed with a recent
Supreme Court decision on parochiaid.58 The Governor noted in his
veto message:
[Tihe changes are designed to further reduce the possibility that
there could be any appearance of impermissible or extensive entanglement, as outlined by the Supreme Court's latest decisions
* * *,Accordingly, before signing the bills into law, at the request
of the proponents and under the authority vested in me by Article
IV, Section 9(e) of the Illinois Constitution, I am returning the
52. Once again, Senator Netsch indicated in the January 22, 1974, interview that
the ambiguity created by the debate was not as unintentional as it might appear. Some
delegates felt that strict procedural guidelines might thwart the progressive and prag-

matic characteristics of the amendatory veto provision. As a result, Senator Netsch
chose not to respond to Delegate Frank Orlando's frequently quoted "No, ma'am" answer.
53. In addition, although the language of the floor debate does not expressly support this thesis, Senator Netsch noted in the January 22, 1974, interview that this feeling was indeed prevalent among numerous delegates.
54. 1971 Op. ILL. ATT'y GEN. 113.
55. Wheeler, Legislators Tell Dangers of Amending Veto Power, Chicago SunTimes, Nov. 22, 1971, at 6, 18, col. 1.
56. Hanley, supra note 33, at 11.
57. Id.

58.

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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bills to the General Assembly with specific recommendations for
change. 59
Governor Ogilvie's efforts resulted in the one and only court case
to date which has dealt with the issue of the scope and limitations of
the amendatory veto power in Illinois.6 ° Unfortunately, for the sake
of interpretation of the constitutional provision, the Illinois Supreme
Court's comments on the amendatory veto in People ex rel. Klinger
v. Howlett were only dicta. The case was decided instead on the technicality that the Governor had no power to allocate the parochiaid
funds since the law would not become effective until July 1, 1972,
nearly eight months after the Governor had appropriated the
funds for the legislation. 61 Additionally, in the one paragraph which
dealt exclusively with the scope of the veto power, the court failed to
clarify the limitations of the Governor's power:
Upon the basis of the imprecise text of the constitutional provision
and the materials before us in this case, we cannot now attempt
to delineate the exact kinds of changes that fall within the power
of the Governor to make specific recommendations for change. It
can be said with certainty, however, that the substitution of comin the present case, is not authorplete new bills, as attempted
62
ized by the constitution.
Therefore, according to this dicta, complete substitution of bills is
unacceptable. Yet, the court ducked any attempt to tell the Governor
what changes would be permissible. Although the court implied the
Governor could make more than grammatical revisions in a bill, it did
not define the potential scope of these alterations. The Klinger decision
baffled Ogilvie, who failed to understand how the court could interpret
the bill he suggested as a complete substitution for those originally
passed by the General Assembly.6" In the words of one who sympathized with the Ogilvie position, "the Illinois Supreme Court's early decision left much to be desired."6 4 Governor Ogilvie left office in January, 1973, without receiving any judicial delineation of the powers
he was leaving behind in Springfield.
The next inhabitant of the Governor's mansion, Daniel Walker, has
met with limited success in his application of the amendatory veto
59. Governor Richard B. Ogilvie, Message on Aid to Students in Nonpublic
Schools, Sept. 10, 1971, as published in the SENATE JouRNAL, 77th Illinois General Assembly, October 5, 1971, at 104.
2d 242, 278 N.E.2d 84 (1972).
60. People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 Ill.
61. Id. at 248, 278 N.E.2d at 87.
62. Id. at 249, 278 N.E.2d at 88.
63. Hanley, supra note 33, at 15.
64. Id. at 16.
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power. In the Seventy-Eighth General Assembly Session, the Governor used his amendatory veto power on thirty-seven bills.6 5 The
Legislature approved only two of the thirty-seven bills amended by the
Governor during the regular session. In response to one of those
amended bills, the General Assembly overrode the Governor's veto of
a sixteen million dollar supplementary assistance grant to the Chicago
Transit Authority.6 6 Most recently, in the 1973 special legislative
session, the Governor and the Legislature combined to pass into law
a limited death penalty bill, complete with Walker's alterations of the
original bill.6 7 When the legislation came to the Governor initially,
the bill (House Bill 18) included the mandatory death penalty for what
the Governor felt was an inappropriate number of crimes. 68 Therefore,
he utilized the amendatory veto to delete those crimes from the bill.69
The Governor also used the power to insert into the bill a three-judge
final review board which could spare the convicted killer of the death
sentence if a majority of the court found a compelling reason for saving
the murderer's life." Finally, the Governor added a paragraph to insure that no execution would be performed until there has been a "final
adjudication that the sentence is constitutional."'
In his veto
message Walker noted that it was his intent to modify the bill not only
to coincide with his personal beliefs, but also to increase the likelihood
72
of its being held constitutional.
The interplay up to this point was reminiscent of Governor Ogilvie's
handling of the parachiaid legislation, with the Chief Executive making
substantive changes in the bill passed by the General Assembly. How65. Illinois Information Service/Record of Action, No. 8, at 1 (1973).
66. Id.
67. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b) (1973); id. § 1005-5-3.
68. H.B. 18, 78th General Assembly, Winter/Spring Session, passed June 30, 1973.
69. Governor Walker omitted the mandatory death sentence for
(1) the murder of an individual who was an elected official of any public
office, Federal, State or local, or a candidate for any such office;
(2) the murder of an individual as a result of the intentional destruction,
alteration, disruption or adulteration of community water, electric, gas,
sewage or transportation facilities, or the contamination of liquid or
solid food products intended for community consumption;
(3) a person who procured the commission of the murder by another
through a contract, agreement or understanding by which he promised
or suggested the payment of money or anything of value in return for
the commission of the murder;
(4) the murder of an individual who was a witness subpoenaed to testify
at a preliminary hearing, trial or grand jury proceeding against the defendant;
(5) a person who was under a sentence of life imprisonment at the time
of the murder.
70. Letter from Governor Daniel Walker to the Illinois House of Representatives,
Sept. 12, 1973.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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ever, one very important development occurred in the legislative life
of House Bill 18. Upon receiving the death penalty bill recommendations from Governor Walker, the General Assembly proceeded to act
in a manner that would have horrified some of the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention. Despite the Convention's apparent intent
to forbid the Legislature from making any further alterations upon receipt of the amendatory veto message, the General Assembly surrep,titiously made two changes in the bill. In the paragraph which dealt
with the compelling reasons against sentencing a defendant to death,
the Legislature added the words "for mercy" to explain the primary
justification for saving the convicted felon's life. 7" Additionally, the
General Assembly amended the final paragraph of the bill to further
explain what is meant by the final adjudication:
For purposes of this Section, "final adjudication" means the completion of the ordinary appellate process in a single case
and does
74
not contemplate the exhaustion of all available remedies.
Since these changes were not objectionable to Governor Walker, he
certified the death penalty bill with his own substantive changes included, and the bill was enacted into law.7 1 If the veto provision
had been strictly interpreted, preventing any substantive changes by the
Governor and prohibiting further revisions by the Legislature, the death
penalty bill would still be in a stalemate. Despite this example of governmental efficiency by means of the flexible interpretation of the
amendatory veto provision, the General Assembly continued to lend
vociferous support to a resolution passed in May, 1973, which would
prevent the Governor from making any further substantive changes in
legislation.
THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

House Joint Resolution-Constitutional Amendment 7,76 sponsored
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-lA(5) (1973).
74. Id. § 1005-8-1A(6).
75. For a further discussion of the constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty
law, see Note, The New Illinois Death Penalty: Double Constitutional Trouble 5
LOYOLA Cmn. L.J. 351 (1974), in this edition.
76. HJR-CA7, 78th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1973). The provision states:
RESOLVED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SEVENTY-EIGHTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
THE SENATE CONCURRING HEREIN-that there shall be submitted to
the electors of the State for adoption or rejection at the next election of members of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois, occurring at least six
months after the legislative approval of this proposition, in the manner provided by law, a proposition to amend Section 9, paragraph (e) of Article IV
of the Constitution, to read as follows:
ARTICLE IV, THE LEGISLATURE.
Section 9. Veto Procedure (e)
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by Representative Charles Fleck and co-sponsored by thirty-one other
representatives, was the Legislature's attempt to limit the amendatory
veto power to "correction of technical errors or matter of form. '" 7
The resolution will appear on the ballot in November, 1974, for the
voters' approval. This attempt to provide some bulwark against the
Governor's powers passed both houses by overwhelming votes, signaling
their desire to interpret article IV, section 9(e), of the constitution in
its narrowest light. 78 Apparently the sentiment in the General
Assembly was that the voters would consider this proposed amendment
an opportunity to express a desire for further separation of powers in
government. According to Senator Robert W. McCarthy, the vote in
November will determine the life of the democratic form of government
in Illinois:
That conflict as you know, Mr. President, the conflict between the
Executive and the Legislature is not unique to the other 49 states.
Presently, it's quite an issue at the national government, it's been
an issue in Germany during the time of Hitler. He had a legislature, but not much power, and so I think the public is very much
interested in expressing themselves on the question of proper compartmentalization between the Legislature and the Executive. 79
Expressing a more realistic but minority opinion, Senator Netsch
argued in vain against the resolution. Referring to the veto provision
as passed by the Convention, the Senator observed:
I do not think the language that was used was as good as it ought
to have been and I felt very regretful about that, but I find
the idea a very important one and a very useful one and I think
it is terribly important to make one thing clear and that it is not
intended and is not a vehicle for giving the Governor additional
power. It was always thought to be a means of accommodation...
80
between the Governor and Legislature.
Apparently, the legislators appear confident that the constitutional

77.
78.
79.
80.

The Governor may return a bill together with specific recommendations for
the correction of technical errors or matters of form to the house in which
it originated. The bill shall be considered in the same manner as a vetoed
bill. If, however, the specific recommendations are accepted by a record
vote of a majority of the members elected to each house, the bill shall be
presented again to the Governor and, if he certifies that the acceptance conforms to his specific recommendations, the bill shall become law. If he
does not so certify, the Governor shall return it as a vetoed bill to the
house in which it originated.
SCHEDULE. This amendment of Section 9, paragraph (e)of Article IV
of the Constitution is effective for each session of the General Assembly
newly convening after its adoption by the electors of this State.
1 Legislative Digest, No. 22 Senate Bill Resolutions, Sept. 21, 1973.
Chicago Daily News, March 9,1973, at 21, col. 4.
Transcript of the Senate Session, May 1, 1973, at 33.
Id. at 34-35.
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amendment will pass, for if it fails, the Governor will have the implied
approval of the people to make further substantive changes in legislation.8 If the amendment fails and if amendatory gubernatorial activity
of a substantive nature continues, the Illinois Supreme Court undoubtedly will once again interpret the amendatory veto provision. At such
a time, the court should attack the issue of the scope of the veto power
82
with more vigor than it exhibited in the Klinger decision.
CONCLUSION

Interpreting the scope of the amendatory veto power in Illinois is
analogous to watching a three-ring circus. In the arena to the right
stands the General Assembly, favoring the utilization of the amendatory
veto power only for technical revisions. The Legislature's enthusiasm
for a strict interpretation is tempered by the possibility that the courts
will allow the Governor to make major substantive changes. In that
case, the General Assembly hopes to be able to make revisions to the
Governor's recommendations. Why, the legislators ask, should the
Governor be able with one stroke of his pen to erase hours of careful
study and analysis? Therefore, the General Assembly favors a broad
latitude for itself and narrow parameters for the Governor.
In the ring to the left sits the Governor, possessively cuddling his
new veto power. The Chief Executive wants the broadest possible interpretation of his powers under the veto provision so he can run the state
government as effectively as possible without provoking criticism that
he is acting dictatorially. The Governor, therefore, favors a flexible
interpretation of the provision when his powers are at issue, but a narrow reading of the Legislature's ability to revise his recommendations.
Meanwhile, in the middle ring the courts have been standing quietly
by. This arena has been the scene of a number of indications in the
past that broad, reasonable interpretations of constitutional provisions
are consistent with the intent of the framers and will survive the test
of judicial scrutiny. Judging by the Illinois Supreme Court's hesitancy
to tackle the amendatory veto problem in Klinger, the chances are excellent that the court will reserve judgment on the scope of the veto
power until the results of the November, 1974, elections are tabulated.
Therefore, the taxpayers, the occupants of the circus seats, will decide
81. Obviously, the ramifications of the November vote are important to the Governor. However, William Goldberg, special counsel to Governor Walker, indicated during a telephone interview on January 21, 1974, that no decision has been made as to
whether or not the Governor plans to actively campaign against the amendment.
82. People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 I1l. 2d 242, 278 N.E.2d 84 (1972).
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the fate of the amendatory veto in Illinois. By passing Constitutional
Amendment 7, the voters will tip the scales so that for all practical
purposes the power of the Governor is reduced to that of a proofreader searching for minor technical errors in the manuscript. If the
voters act wisely and reject the amendment, the courts are likely to
give the Governor freedom to make substantive changes in legislation
within reasonable limits. It is also likely that the courts would grant
the General Assembly the flexibilty to constructively revise the Governor's recommendations. This attitude of flexibility would be consistent with the Convention's desire to maximize the legislative efficiency
of state government.
So until November of 1974, the voters can cringe with the Legislature in terror, applaud with the executive branch in delight, or remain
with the judiciary in seclusion, at the three-ring amendatory veto circus
in Springfield.
DAVID W. INLANDER

